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Justifying Democracy and Its Authority
Abstract In this paper I will discuss a recent attempt of justifying democracy 
and its authority. It pertains to recently published papers by Niko Kolodny, which 
complement each other and taken together practically assume a form of a 
monograph (Kolodny 2014a, Kolodny 2014b). It could be said that Kolodny’s 
approach is a non-standard one given that he avoids typical ways of justifying 
democracy. Namely, when a justification of democracy is concerned, Kolodny 
maintains that it is necessary to offer a kind of an independent justification. It is 
not so much that he insists that the usual approaches are wrong as much as that 
an independent justification is necessary in order to discern what it is that gives 
them their significance. Kolodny’s independent justification of democracy is 
based on the idea of social equality. In this paper I will try to reconstruct and 
critically assess Kolodny’s approach by paying special attention to the question 
of democratic authority.
Keywords: democracy, instrumental justification, intrinsic justification, equal 
opportunity for influence, democratic authority
When justifying democracy it is necessary to adduce certain values such as 
freedom, equality, justice, dignity.1 The basic idea is that democratic deci-
sion making is to a greater extent than other forms of decision making in 
accordance with these values. However, “in accordance with these values“ 
can have a twofold interpretation. First, it can be assumed that it concerns 
values which are independent of democratic decision making; democrat-
ic procedure is then justified to the degree to which its outcomes advance 
or at least do not conflict with these independent values. We then speak 
about instrumental justification of democracy because democratic proce-
dures are justified to the extent to which they contribute to preservation or 
advancement of values that are independent of the procedure itself. Sec-
ond, it can be assumed that certain values are integral to the very proce-
dure of democratic decision making. In that sense, we say that procedures 
which guarantee free and equal access to the process of decision making 
are intrinsically fair. We then speak about intrinsic justification of democ-
racy because democratic procedures themselves are justified on the basis 
of their intrinsic characteristics. 
1  This paper was realized as a part of the project No. 43007 financed by the Minis-
try of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia.
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Therefore, a theorist attempting to provide a normative justification of de-
mocracy encounters two dilemmas. The first dilemma concerns the most 
adequate way of justifying democracy. The second dilemma concerns the 
values that should be given precedence when justifying democracy. If the 
first dilemma is concerned, a justification of democracy can be either mo-
nistic or dualistic (Christiano 2004: 266). If we opt for one of the afore-
mentioned types of justification, then our justification is monistic, which 
means that it is either purely instrumental or purely procedural. But a jus-
tification of democracy can also be dualistic, if we maintain that it is nec-
essary for this task to take into account intrinsic fairness of procedures, but 
also some values which are independent of procedures. When the second 
dilemma is concerned, an approach can also be either monistic or plural-
istic. Namely, an attempt to justify democracy can either be based on only 
one value (for example, equality or autonomy) or on an entire set of val-
ues, seen either independently or as a part of a democratic decision making 
procedure. Therefore, when justifying democracy we usually adopt either 
monistic or dualistic approach in terms of the type of justification and we 
usually adopt either monistic or pluralistic approach in terms of values. 
It is noteworthy that a justification of democracy must not necessarily im-
ply a justification of its authority. The justification of political authority 
primarily refers to the question about the source of political obligation. 
An answer to this question can also be either monistic or dualistic. I think 
that an answer to the question about the source of democratic authority 
must necessarily be dualistic. Namely, both instrumental and purely pro-
cedural justifications of democratic authority encounter familiar problems. 
A purely instrumental justification faces the problem of indeterminacy. If 
outcomes of an undemocratic way of decision making largely contribute to 
preservation or advancement of independent values, then this way of de-
cision making should be given precedence over democracy. Therefore, the 
very source of political obligation remains indeterminate. A purely proce-
dural justification of democratic authority encounters the problem of in-
distinctiveness. Namely, no matter how unfair outcomes of a democratic 
decision making may be, citizens equally bear political obligations, given 
the intrinsic fairness of democratic procedures. It seems to me that dual-
ism is necessary in order to address problems of indeterminacy and indis-
tinctiveness. In brief, a solution for the problem of indeterminacy consists 
in adducing intrinsic fairness of procedures which distinguish democracy 
from other forms of political decision making. The solution for the problem 
of indistinctiveness consists in adducing an independent value that enables 
an independent assessment of outcomes of democratic decision making. If 
procedures are intrinsically fair and if their outcomes at least do not un-
dermine independent values (such as freedom and equality), then we also 
have an adequate justification of democratic authority, which obviously has 
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to be dualistic. An interesting question which has not been sufficiently dis-
cussed is whether a justification of democratic authority should be monistic 
or pluralistic in terms of values. Without further reflection on this issue, I 
will assume that when justifying democratic authority, one can also adopt 
either monistic or pluralistic approach in terms of values. 
In this paper I will discuss a recent attempt of justifying democracy and its 
authority. It pertains to recently published papers by Niko Kolodny, which 
complement each other and taken together practically assume a form of a 
monograph (Kolodny 2014a, Kolodny 2014b). It could be said that Kolod-
ny’s approach is non-standard given that he avoids typical monistic ways 
of justifying democracy, consequently not juxtaposing it to a dualistic al-
ternative. Namely, when a justification of democracy is concerned, Kolodny 
maintains that it is necessary to offer a kind of an independent justifica-
tion. It is not so much that he insists that the two usual monistic approach-
es are wrong as much as that an independent justification is necessary in 
order to discern what it is that gives them their significance. Kolodny’s in-
dependent justification of democracy is based on the idea of social equal-
ity. Considering that it is based on only the value of equality, employing 
previously explained terminology one can say that it is monistic in terms 
of values. In the remainder of this paper, I will try to reconstruct and crit-
ically assess Kolodny’s approach. I will begin with Kolodny’s definition of 
a democratic decision making:
What is it for a political decision to be “democratically” made? As a more 
or less stipulated starting point, I say that a political decision is democrat-
ically made when it is made by a process that gives everyone subject to 
it equal or both equal and positive, formal or both formal and informal 
opportunity for informed influence either over it or over decisions that 
delegate the making of it. (Kolodny 2014a: 197)
Obviously, the essential thing about democracy according to the definition 
is an equal opportunity for influence. However, as can be seen, this oppor-
tunity for influence can be only equal or both equal and positive and can 
be only formal or both formal and informal. If an only equal opportunity is 
concerned, then a democratic decision making also includes lottery which 
gives to everyone an equal, but not a positive opportunity for influence, be-
cause a decision of each individual participant does not necessarily have to 
be reflected in the outcome, as is the case with voting. In the case of voting, 
an opportunity for influence would be both equal and positive. To safeguard 
this, a formal equality regarding an opportunity for influence is necessary. 
It includes a universal voting right but also an assumption that each vote is 
weighted equally. The opportunity for influence is equal not only in formal 
but also in informal sense when resources necessary for an informed partici-
pation in a democratic process have been distributed on an egalitarian basis. 
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Kolodny thinks that there are the three questions to which a justification 
of democracy should provide a solution: 
 1. Institutions: Why should we want, or establish, or maintain demo-
cratic institutions? Why do we, in general, have reason to try, over 
the long run, to make political decisions democratically? 
 2. Authority: Why does the fact that a political decision was made dem-
ocratically contribute, pro tanto, to my being morally required, as 
an official or a citizen of the relevant polity, to implement or com-
ply with it? 
 3. Legitimacy: Why does the fact that a political decision was made 
democratically contribute, pro tanto, to its being permissible to im-
plement it, even despite its treating me, as a citizen of the relevant 
polity, in distinctively “political” ways that, at least in other contexts, 
are objectionable, such as using force against me, threatening to use 
force against me, or coercing me? (Kolodny 2014a: 197)
Now Kolodny suggests the following strategy of justification of  democracy. 
Considering that democracy has been defined as an equal (or both equal 
and positive) opportunity for influence over decision making, the first step 
is to look for an independent justification of such a view of democracy. 
Once an independent justification for an equal opportunity for influence 
over decision making has been provided, on these foundations all three 
questions related to justification of democracy are to be resolved. In this 
paper I shall particularly focus on his solution to the question of Authori-
ty. However, before I proceed to discuss the first step of Kolodny’s strate-
gy of a justification of democracy, another clarification regarding his ap-
proach is in order. 
Namely, Kolodny distinguishes between interests in correspondence, inter-
ests in influence and substantive interests (Kolodny 2014a: 199). These are 
different kinds of interests which citizens have in connection with political 
decision making in a society. At first glance, considering that democracy has 
been defined only in terms of influence, adducing two other kinds of inter-
ests seems superfluous. However, it seems that Kolodny introduces these 
two additional kinds of interests in order to suggest that there are some 
difficulties in usual ways of justifying democracy. In a nutshell, interests 
in correspondence pertain to the fact that outcomes of political decision 
making are in accordance with our preferences and judgments. Interests 
in influence pertain to an opportunity for our preferences or judgments to 
positively influence the final decision. Substantive interests pertain to re-
alization of some substantive values in outcomes of political decision mak-
ing (for example, that decisions contribute to the achievement of freedom, 
welfare, justice etc). 
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What is the problem with interests in correspondence? Obviously, a dem-
ocratic decision making is not necessary for interests in correspondence to 
be satisfied. A benevolent despot could bring a decision that would satisfy 
preferences of a large number of citizens even though they have not had the 
opportunity to express their preferences in a decision making process. For 
example, Mill maintained that the chance that a benevolent despot could 
know the preferences of citizens better than citizens themselves were very 
slim which is why democracy should be given precedence over other forms 
of political decision making (Mill 1861/1977: Chapter III). The question 
however is whether this is an argument in favor of interests in correspon-
dence. The opportunity for people to express their preferences in a process 
of democratic decision making does not mean that these preferences would 
necessarily be reflected in an outcome of decision making. Therefore, Mill’s 
argument should rather be understood as related to interests in influence.
Kolodny points to additional problems with interests in correspondence. 
Namely, a statistical sample could show which preferences and judgments 
a majority of citizens hold. If it is so, interests in correspondence could 
be satisfied if a decision is brought on the basis of consulting this statistic 
sample. However, such a decision would hardly be considered democrat-
ic (Kolodny 2014a: 207). What this argument suggests is that interests in 
influence are essential for a democratic decision making. Furthermore, an 
additional problem concerns what kind of preferences should be met. Do 
any preferences a person currently holds have to be taken into account or 
only informed preferences? This gives rise to a dilemma whether an infe-
rior decision that takes into account preferences of each person as they are 
should be accepted or a superior decision that requires a person to revise 
her preferences in the light of information and reasons offered by other 
people (Kolodny 2014a: 207). In any case, it is not clear whether satisfy-
ing interests in correspondence requires that others adjust to a given per-
son or that she revises her preferences in the light of a better argument. 
What is the problem with substantive interests? Obviously, the idea of sub-
stantive interests suggests instrumental justification of democracy. An in-
strumental justification of democracy first presupposes that there are sub-
stantive interests which are independent of the process of political decision 
making. It subsequently argues that democracy, in general, is a more re-
liable way over the long run to protect and advance substantive interests 
than any other form of political decision making. Kolodny gives two argu-
ments which show what the problem with substantive interests in political 
decision making is and consequently also with an instrumental justification 
of democracy. The first problem is that the fact that a democratic decision 
making, in general, leads to better outcomes regarding substantive inter-
ests does not provide a solution to the issue of Authority and Legitimacy 
in each individual application of a democratic procedure. In other words, 
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that democratic institutions are, in general, justified does not guarantee 
legitimacy and authority of democracy in each particular case. Kolodny 
terms this problem the Bridging Problem (Kolodny 2014a: 201). The sec-
ond problem is that if it is some elite that would bring a decision that would 
satisfy substantive interests better than a democratic decision making, it 
still makes sense to raise a question why would anyone be excluded from 
a process of decision making. The decision making by an elite rejects what 
Kolodny terms the Equality Constraint in line with which “if a procedure 
gives anyone a say, it should give everyone an equal say” (Kolodny 2014a: 
202). Since we cannot adduce substantive interests, it is necessary to look 
for some other foundation of the Equality Constraint. And it is only the in-
terests in influence that remain at the disposal for this purpose. 
The previous reconstruction of Kolodny’s standpoint could be summed up 
in the following way. Democracy is largely defined as an equal opportunity 
for influence over political decision making. The justification of democracy 
includes two steps. The first step is to offer an independent justification for 
democracy, that is, to solve the issue what the foundation of an equal pos-
sibility for influence over decision making is. The second step is to answer 
the questions of Institutions, Authority and Legitimacy. In addition to inter-
ests in influence, Kolodny also introduces interests in correspondence and 
substantive interests, ascertaining that they are not adequate for a justifi-
cation of democracy, which leaves us only with interests in influence. Con-
sidering that an instrumental justification of democracy which is based on 
substantive interests encounters two problems, the Bridging Problem and 
the impossibility of deriving the Equality Constraint, the question is raised 
whether these problems can be solved if interests in influence are taken 
into account. If it could be shown that there is an independent justification 
for an equal opportunity for influence over decision making, then this solu-
tion could lead to the second part of justification which pertains to Institu-
tions, Authority and Legitimacy. Or at least this is what Kolodny assumes.
I have already suggested that the first step in Kolodny’s justification of de-
mocracy is based on the idea of social equality. The basic idea is first to show 
that social equality is the basis of an equal opportunity for influence over 
political decision making. Kolodny points out that examples of a slave or a 
servant manifestly illustrate social inequality. Our rejection of slavery sug-
gests an attitude that permanent social relations should be based on social 
equality. It implies that social relations should be such that there is anyone 
else who would be above us but also that there is anyone else who would 
be below us. Or, as Kolodny puts it, social equality implies an idea about 
“a society in which none rules over any other“ (Kolodny 2014a: 196). He 
claims that social inequality is actually based on three things: power, de facto 
authority and greater consideration (Kolodny 2014b: 295–296). Namely, if 
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some have greater power and others do not have any right to limit it or if 
some have a position of authority which others also do not have any right 
to limit or if some have greater consideration on the basis of some proper-
ties such as wealth or race, then we have an asymmetrical relation which 
is typical of social inequality. Social inequality can be reported in either a 
political or a non-political domain, for example at work or in the family. 
Kolodny, however, maintains that the following characteristics of political 
decision making suggest that decision making in this domain should be in 
accordance with social equality: “that subjection to them is not voluntary, 
that they are treated as having final authority, and that they involve the 
use of force” (Kolodny 2014a: 226). In order to avoid asymmetry of power 
and authority in the political domain, it is necessary that regarding pow-
er and authority all citizens have an equal opportunity for influence. It is 
thus avoided that any person should have greater consideration when mak-
ing a decision. Since democracy has been defined as an equal opportunity 
for influence over political decision making, it means that it is an import-
ant integral part of social equality. Or as Kolodny says “the thesis, then, is 
that it is a particularly important component of relations of social equality 
among individuals that they enjoy equal opportunity for influence over the 
political decisions to which they are subject” (Kolodny 2014b: 308). He in-
terprets the phrase “a particularly important component“ as implying that 
without an equal opportunity for influence over political decisions, full or 
ideal social equality is not possible, and that even when full social equality 
cannot be attained, an equal opportunity for influence brings us closer to 
this ideal (Kolodny 2014b: 308–309). This completes the first part of a jus-
tification of democracy, that is, an independent justification of  democracy 
on the basis of social equality. 
However, the first objection to Kolodny’s justification of democracy can 
be made here. Namely, it is not entirely clear how one arrives from social 
equality to democracy. Let us call this the original bridging problem. I think 
that any justification of democracy either in terms of justice or equality 
has to show how the given conception of justice or equality establishes 
democracy (Christiano 2008). Therefore it is not a coincidence that usu-
al devices for solving the original bridging problem include either actual 
or hypothetical consent. Or more recently public reason or some criterion 
of acceptability (Estlund 2008: Chapter III). The solution of the original 
bridging problem according to these conceptions leads to solving what 
Kolodny terms the Bridging Problem because it provides a foundation for 
a solution to the questions of Authority and Legitimacy. Since Kolodny does 
not show how to proceed from social equality to arrive to democracy, the 
original bridging problem remains unresolved. In that regard, his claim 
that social equality implies an equal opportunity for influence over politi-
cal decision-making is not of great avail (Kolodny 2014a: 227). This claim 
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actually presupposes what has to be proved, namely that democracy is an 
important constitutive part of social equality. 
Let us proceed to the second part of a justification of democracy which 
provides solution to the questions of Institutions, Authority and Legitima-
cy. In what follows, as I have already suggested, I will focus only on the 
question of Authority. This is how Kolodny thinks that previous discussion 
could help us answer the question of Authority:
If I were to disregard the democratic decision, then I would be depriving 
others of equal opportunity to influence this very decision. For influence 
over the decision, in the sense relevant in this context, is not simply in-
fluence over what gets engraved on tablets or printed in registers; it is 
influence over what is actually done. Insofar as relations of social equal-
ity are partly constituted by precisely that equal opportunity for influ-
ence, I would be, by depriving others of that equal influence, relating to 
them as a social superior, at least in that instance. If others have a claim 
on me to avoid relations of social superiority, then they have at least that 
claim on me to implement the democratic decision. (Kolodny 2014b: 315)
As we can see, Kolodny maintains that the foundation of democracy on 
the idea of social equality can help us resolve the Bridging Problem (by as-
suming that the first step in justification established what Kolodny terms 
the Equality Constraint). Namely, according to this view, we have political 
obligations because disrespecting decisions of democratic decision making 
process would imply that we do not consider that every citizen has an equal 
opportunity for influence over political decision making, which means that 
we reject the idea of social equality. But since the idea of social equality 
is something we accept independently of democratic decision making, as 
well as that an equal opportunity for influence is an important constitutive 
part of social equality, we do have an obligation to comply with outcomes 
of democratic decision making. Therefore, democratic authority also has a 
foundation in social equality, and it requires that in each case of a democrat-
ic decision making we adhere by the given decision. Thereby the Bridging 
Problem is resolved, at least when the question of Authority is concerned. 
It seems however that the second part of justification of democracy, at 
least when the question of Authority is concerned, also encounters certain 
problems. We have previously emphasized that Kolodny’s justification of 
democracy is monistic in terms of values because it is based only on the 
value of social equality. We are now in the position to see that Kolodny’s 
justification of democratic authority is also monistic in terms of values. 
However, this relying on monism in terms of values, that is, exclusive ad-
ducing of the value of equality creates certain problems similar to those 
with which pure proceduralism is faced when it comes to justifying demo-
cratic authority. Namely, according to this view, we have the obligation to 
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comply with decisions which ensue from democratic procedures because 
these very procedures are intrinsically fair. The problem for this view is that 
it is not clear whether there are any limits to authority of democracy. The 
problem of indistinctiveness here equally applies. It turns out that there is 
no difference regarding political obligations between decisions which are 
fair and those which are deeply unfair, which for example suspend some 
fundamental rights and freedoms. We have consequently argued that cer-
tain type of dualism which includes an intrinsic fairness of procedures but 
also independent values is necessary for a justification of democratic au-
thority. Kolodny’s justification of democratic authority also encounters the 
problem of indistinctiveness. Namely, decisions may be such that an equal 
opportunity for influence has been fully acknowledged and that decisions 
are nevertheless deeply unfair, for instance suspending some fundamental 
rights and freedoms. The requirement of social equality requires that such 
decisions be equally respected as other fair decisions. But then it cannot 
be seen what the limits of democratic authority are. It seems that what 
creates a problem is monism in terms of values when justifying authority 
of democracy. Therefore, analogous to rejection of monism in a justifica-
tion of democratic authority, monism in terms of values when justifying 
authority of democracy should also be rejected. 
In this paper I have considered a significant recent attempt of justifying 
democracy and its authority. Namely, in his papers, Niko Kolodny has of-
fered a justification of democracy and its authority which is based on social 
equality. The first step in that endeavor is to offer an independent justifi-
cation of an equal opportunity for influence over political decision making 
on the basis of the idea of social equality. The second step implies that the 
Equality Constraint can help us provide a solution to the questions of Insti-
tutions, Authority and Legitimacy. The solution to these issues, according 
to Kolodny, enables us to solve what he terms the Bridging Problem, that 
is, suggests why using democratic procedures, which are in general jus-
tified, generates legitimacy and political obligations in particualar cases. 
I have concluded that both steps of Kolodny’s justification of democracy 
encounter serious problems. The first step in the justification encounters 
the problem which I have termed the original bridging problem. In short, 
Kolodny has not demonstrated how to arrive from social equality to de-
mocracy. The second step in the justification encounters the problem of in-
distinctiveness. In short, the fact that Kolodny’s justification of democratic 
authority is monistic, that is, is based only on the value of social equality, 
raises the problem that some deeply unfair decisions which, for instance, 
suspend some fundamental rights and freedoms, equally generate political 
obligations. I have suggested that this problem can be avoided by providing 
a dualistic justification of democratic authority and by rejecting monism of 
values in this type of justification. 
748
JUstIFyINg DeMOcRAcy AND Its AUthORItyIvan MladenovIć
References
Christiano, Thomas (2004), „The Authority of Democracy“, Journal of Political 
Philosophy 12: 266–290.
Christiano, Thomas (2008), The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and Its 
Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Estlund, David M. (2008), Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework. Princeton 
and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Kolodny, Niko (2014a), „Rule Over None I: What Justifies Democracy?“, Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 42: 195–229.
Kolodny, Niko (2014b), „Rule Over None II: Social Equality and the Justification of 
Democracy“, Philosophy & Public Affairs 42: 287–336.
Mill, John Stuart (1861/1977), „Considerations on Representative Government“, 
in: Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. XIX: Essays on Politics and Society. 
Toronto, London: University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
pp. 371–577.
Ivan Mladenović
Opravdanje demokratije i njenog autoriteta
Apstrakt
U ovom radu diskutovaćemo jedan skorašnji pokušaj opravdanja demokratije i 
njenog autoriteta. Reč je o nedavno objavljenim tekstovima Nika Kolodnjija (Niko 
Kolodny), koji se međusobno dopunjuju i uzeti zajedno skoro da imaju oblik 
monografije (Kolodny 2014a, Kolodny 2014b). Moglo bi se reći da je Kolodnjijev 
pristup nestandardan s obzirom da on izbegava tipične načine opravdanja 
demokratije. Naime, kada je reč o opravdanju demokratije, Kolodnji smatra da 
je potrebno ponuditi neku vrstu nezavisnog opravdanja u odnosu na uobičajene 
pristupe. Ne insistira se toliko da su dva uobičajena pristupa pogrešna, koliko da 
je potrebno nezavisno opravdanje kako bi se uvidelo ono što im uopšte daje 
bilo kakav značaj. Kolodnjijevo nezavisno opravdanje demokratije zasniva se na 
ideji o društvenoj jednakosti. U radu ćemo nastojati da rekonstruišemo i kritički 
procenimo Kolodnjijevo stanovište posvećujući posebnu pažnju pitanju autorite-
ta demokratije. 
Ključne reči: demokratija, instrumentalno opravdanje, intrinsično opravdanje, 
jednaka mogućnost za uticaj, autoritet demokratije
